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Figure 1a Number of active COVID-19 cases, China, 7 January 2021
Source: Worldometer: COVID-19 corona virus pandemic 

Figure 1b Number of active COVID-19 cases, Thailand, 7 January 2021
Source: Worldometer: COVID-19 corona virus pandemic


Figure 1c Number of active COVID-19 cases, USA, 7 January 2021
Source: Worldometer: COVID-19 corona virus pandemic. 
Note: Worldometer collects statistics and data from the most reputable national and international organizations; see https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/about/#sources. The number of cases depends on capacity and availability of standard molecular testing using RT-PCR in a country. The authors cannot verify the accuracy and completeness of data in Worldometer.

WHO recommendations on COVID-19 responses have been affirmed by countries’ implementation experiences​[2]​, ​[3]​. These responses can be categorized into three groups: a) preventing local transmission through social and public health measures, notably use of face masks and physical distancing in public spaces​[4]​, testing to identify cases, contact tracing, quarantine of affected persons, treatment of severe cases and preventing hospital-acquired COVID-19; b) ensuring and mobilizing sufficient physical, human and financial resources to perform public health functions and provide access to clinical services to minimize mortality while maintaining other essential health services; and c) governance arrangements, especially whole-of-government orchestrated actions on pandemic management and risk communication with citizens which are key enabling factors.

WHO recommendations on physical distancing and use of facemasks are based on systematic review and meta-analysis​[5]​. Use of face masks is not just for self-protection, but also protects others from respiratory droplets from asymptomatic individuals​[6]​. The high proportion, 50–75% in Italy​[7]​ and 78% in China​[8]​, who tested positive but were asymptomatic supports the use of masks for source control​[9]​. A study in 20 614 asymptomatic health care workers, risk for infection was reduced with any mask use versus no mask use; OR, 0.58 (CI, 0.50 to 0.66)​[10]​. 

Three settings, China, Thailand and New York State, with very different outcomes, are used to demonstrate their responses relative to WHO recommendations, assess the impact on the health delivery system and draw lessons on how to protect health systems from being overwhelmed by COVID-19. 

China and Thailand locate prime responsibility for outbreak management at central level and have a nation-wide homogenous policy response with implementation through provincial authorities; in contrast the state-federal system in the US results in large variations in COVID-19 responses across states. For this reason two countries are compared with a US state, with New York State given it was the initial epicentre of the US epidemic. By January 2021, New York state with a population of 19.5 million reported total 1,098,725 cases; 38,879 deaths and 573,358 active cases. 

Through comparing, analysing, and drawing lessons on timing, coverage and effectiveness of public health and social measures and mobilizing adequate resources, both of which are shaped by the governance and citizen’s trust and adherence to official advice, in three very different settings, this paper argues that prompt and effective containment measures are critical to prevent health systems disruption and draws lessons to guide effective future public health interventions.

2. Preventing local transmission 
At the very early stage of the epidemic, the Chinese and Thai governments applied public health measures​[11]​, notably the use of face masks​[12]​ which are mandatory in public spaces in China given a high perceived risk of transmission​[13]​, but not mandatory in Thailand though there is a very high level of citizens’ awareness and adherence. Physical distancing, hand hygiene and improved ventilation in living spaces are enforced through a whole-of-society approach with high compliance in China and Thailand; these practices varied across States in the US. While Thai and Chinese governments applied strict measures to test, trace and quarantine, practices in New York State were not as rigorous. The practice of active case finding was guided by epidemiological evidence in Thailand and China while it varies across states in US. In Thailand, the training of field epidemiologists since 1980​[14]​ meant there was a corps of over 1,000 Surveillance and Rapid Response Teams nation-wide, responsible for public health measures. Thailand monitored citizens’ personal preventive behaviour (use of face masks, hand hygiene, physical distancing) through weekly online surveys between April and December 2020 with results reported to the government and general public. 

In New York State, the first COVID-19 case and death were reported on February 29 and March 11, 2020​[15]​. The State’s response was limited by its laboratory testing capacity and the initial guidance to target testing to individuals with history of exposure, as recommended by the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Information from its surveillance of emergency department visits showed influenza-like illnesses were on the rise, raising the spectre of community spread​[16]​. New York State implemented the usual public health measures. A communications campaign emphasized hand washing and social distancing, which was modelled by the City mayor in his conduct of business. Public messages urged people to stay home if symptomatic (e.g. fever and cough) and to seek testing if ill. A contact tracing system was implemented​[17]​ with considerable support offered to people recommended to self-quarantine, though adherence is not known. New York state’s responses in term of contact tracing and quarantine were not as systematic and rigorous as in Thailand and China, as shown by the rapid spread of infection.

Coverage of face masks was 95% in Thailand​[18]​ and China​[19]​. Despite the US Surgeon General and US CDC advice that everyone should wear a mask, it was up to state and local governments to issue mandates, and not all did so. By July 2020, 72% of US states had mandated the use of masks in public places​[20]​, but on average, only 59% of US citizens reported always wearing a mask when leaving home, with large geographical variation reflecting differences in disease risk and politics​[21]​.  

On March 13, with 95 confirmed COVID-19 cases but far more suspected​[22]​, the New York mayor announced a state of emergency, limiting gatherings and urging work from home where possible. It was a two full weeks after the first confirmed case before the decision was taken by public health authorities to limit population movement, closing restaurants, bars and schools. They also further limited public gatherings, effectively beginning an economic shutdown. Similar to New York City, the Thai government declared a State of Emergency nationwide on 25 March, which triggered prompt interventions such as a “stay at home” policy, physical distancing, scaled-up local private sector production of face masks and PPE, closure of all public venues and a curfew between 22.00 and 04.00 to prevent all social gatherings. Though China did not declare a state of emergency, the government encouraged a stay home policy, discouraged mass gatherings, cancelled or postponed large public events, and closed schools, universities, government offices, libraries, museums and factories​[23]​. 

To respond to demand spikes for N95 and face masks and given the global shortage, the Thai private sector constructed a new factory in a month and supplied free N95 masks to health facilities as its corporate social responsibility; China also scaled up daily production of N95 and non-N95 masks, from 0.013 and 5.86 million in February to 5 and 200 million by April. There were 1,266 certified PCR laboratories nationwide in China, while Thailand scaled up from 80 laboratories in April to 244 nation-wide in September. In the US, there was a critical shortage of face masks including N95 as the country relied on contractors and suppliers from the developing world​[24]​. 

Although there are no comparable data using standard tools, such as using mobile device location across the three settings to monitor population mobility, policies were introduced in China and Thailand which discouraged domestic mobility while practice varied across US States. All three settings introduced restrictions on international travel.  By June 2020, the infection had not spread to other provinces in China except for some small-scale outbreaks in Beijing, Liaoning and Xinjiang. Thailand has not reported local transmission since 25 May 2020; all subsequent infections have been in international arrivals detected during the 14 day mandatory quarantine, though in December 2020 there was a surge of second wave of local transmissions. New York State was able to bring down the epidemic curve by the end of May 2020, but there were still approximately 1,000 cases per day between June and September; and a major surge of second wave in the last quarter of 2020,  up from 3,000 cases per day in October to 12,000 in December. 

3. Mobilizing physical and human resources and financing COVID-19 services 
The Chinese government mobilized 346 medical teams consisting of 42,600 medical and 900 public health professionals to support Wuhan city and Hubei province. Two new hospitals were rapidly constructed with a total of 2,600 beds designated for treatment while 16 mobile cabin hospitals with 14,000 beds were designated for mandatory quarantine of mild patients​[25]​. 

Thailand’s cases were similarly concentrated; the top ten affected provinces had 87% of total cases, prompting the MOPH to mobilize surge capacity of ICU bed and specialists, though they were eventually not fully needed. Pressure on health facilities in Bangkok at the peak of the epidemic triggered the development, in consultation with stakeholders, of a “rationing protocol”​[26]​ which was eventually not applied as demand for critical resources was small.

In New York City, mobilisation efforts were more fragmented. Hospital beds were set up in a Convention Centre and a medical tent in the city’s Central Park by a non-profit organization. Volunteer health workers came from other jurisdictions. The public and private hospital systems sought to collaborate to rationalize access to critical resources such as ICU beds and ventilators​[27]​, ​[28]​ when needs from COVID-19 patients rose exponentially and exceeded capacity​[29]​.  Evidence shows lack of federal government support to the New York State’s mitigation efforts, in a context of the politicization of COVID-19 responses in the US, and conflict and disagreements between New York Governor Cuomo and President Trump over the gravity of New York’s situation​[30]​.  

The Chinese local governments were responsible for financing the mandatory test and quarantine of international travelers. In China, the Ministry of Finance allocated US$ 23.8 billion by May 2020 to support the local governments’ effective response​[31]​. Since China has universal health coverage, the two social health insurance schemes paid treatment costs, while other costs were fully subsidized by the Government.  Similarly, the Thai government earmarked additional funding for free RT-PCR tests for all suspected cases, PPE for specimen collection and state quarantine for all Thais and non-Thais; treatment for patients was fully covered by universal health coverage with zero copayment. Though uninsured populations in the US were liable to pay for treatment, the federal government paid doctors and hospitals for these uninsured at Medicare reimbursement rates on condition of no balance billing to COVID-19 patients​[32]​. Some insurance companies waived copayment for insured members​[33]​. The upsurge of demand and supply side constraints in New York State resulted in long queues and likely inability to access treatment, unlike in Thailand and China where everyone who needed treatment had access.

4. Governance and public communication 
The Thai government established a Centre for COVID-19 Situation Administration for coordinated multi-sectoral actions —a whole-of-government response, led by the Prime Minister​[34]​. Similarly, a whole-of-government approach in China involved central and provincial governments coordinated actions​[35]​. Both countries used epidemic data and trends to inform policy responses; daily confirmed cases and deaths were publicly reported and risks communicated to gain citizens’ trust and adherence to policy interventions. A multi-country survey on public perceptions of government responses shows a high Chinese score (80.48, SD 16.31, out of 100), and a much lower score in the US ( 50.57, SD 28.99, though Thailand was not included​[36]​.  

The US media, particularly print journalism, emerged as the most ready source of COVID-19 related public health data. They reported overwhelmed public hospitals, overflowing morgues and difficulty obtaining testing​[37]​. Further, the conflicting announcements between the New York governor and the mayor reflected a longstanding rivalry that was manifest throughout the initial surge in COVID-19 cases​[38]​. The City faced failure of governance on many fronts: lack of federal government support to expand laboratory capacity and identify community spread, a state authority that seemed to compete with city public health structures, and reluctance of the City’s political leadership to take actions that would change daily life, greatly increasing hardship especially in low-income communities. Twitter data shows inconsistent messaging toward wearing masks, incongruent communications on risk of infection and insufficient communications on the proper use of disinfectant against virus​[39]​. In contrast, in both China and Thailand, strong and unified governance structures ensured consistent communications; for example there is no federal-state relationship in Thailand and provincial governors were delegated full power for COVID-19 management, where municipality mayor is one of the members of the Provincial Infectious Disease Control Committee chaired by the governor. 

5. COVID-19: impact on health services  
In China, between January and June 2020, the numbers of outpatient visits and admissions were 21.6% and 16.6% lower compared with the same period in 2019​[40]​. Decline in health service utilization was also reported from Wuhan. This was due to travel restrictions, and longer duration of NCD drug prescriptions. Though the number of cases in Thailand was within the capacity of the health delivery system, there was a slight reduction in the coverage of fully immunized children, from 83% in the first quarter of 2020 to 79.9% in the second quarter; there was no interruption of life-saving interventions such as antiretroviral treatment and dialysis. National level decline of outpatient utilization was reported, and also in Bangkok.   

In New York State, the much higher case numbers led to much more severe consequences. COVID-19 deaths rose to 800 per day and some 23,000 confirmed and probable deaths were recorded before transmission began to decline, with disproportionate deaths among Black and Latino populations who are overrepresented in the lowest socioeconomic groups​[41]​. Of the total 32,107 deaths reported to the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, 24,172 (75%) were in excess of the seasonal expected baseline from a regression model. Of these 24,172 deaths, 57% were laboratory-confirmed COVID-19–associated deaths, 21% probable COVID-19–associated deaths and 22% excess deaths that were not identified as either laboratory-confirmed or probable COVID-19–associated deaths​[42]​--likely attributable to health system disruptions. On July 1, there were 295,984 active cases in New York, which clearly overwhelmed the health delivery systems and the capacity to maintain other essential health services, though data are unavailable on the consequences.  Emergency medical services in New York City faced unprecedented challenges in patient acuity and bed management, high levels of stress and fatigue​[43]​; and surge clinics were set up to offload the emergency departments​[44]​. 

6. Conclusion 




Effective government action at the very early stage of the epidemic in China and Thailand successfully contained cases through synergies between public health and social interventions, and high levels of citizen adherence to personal protection. Evidence from other countries shows that effective and decisive leadership through whole-of-government responses​[45]​, transparency and accountability of decision makers contribute to better containment​[46]​.  The politicizing of COVID-19 and poor coordination between federal and state, and state and city governments impedes the whole-of-government responses in the US compared with China and Thailand. Further, universal health coverage in China and Thailand ensured full access to public health interventions and medical treatment. 

Population adherence was a critical influence on the epidemic, and population and government attitudes and positions determined adherence. The US has much lower coverage of face masks than in Thailand and China. The US libertarian values of emphasizing personal liberty and disregarding official advice, and public discourse framing this public health measure as an infringement on personal liberty, meant the decision to wear a mask reflected a political position. 
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Table 1 Summary policy responses and impacts in China, Thailand and New York State. 
	China 	Thailand 	New York State 
1. Social and public health measures 
 Use of face masks and physical distancing 	Mandatory in public areas with high adherence 	Voluntary and high adherence 	Partial implementation with large variations across states 
 Restriction of domestic travel and social gatherings 	No State of Emergency introduced, but high compliance with stay at home policy	State of Emergency declared, high level of compliance with stay at home 	Belated  State of Emergency introduced two weeks after the first cases resulting in significant upsurge of cases   
 Restriction of inbound international arrivals 	Applied, mandatory test and State quarantine for all travelers 	Applied, mandatory State quarantine for all arrivals 	NA 
 Test, trace, quarantine 	Rigorous implementation and mandatory quarantine of positive cases	Scaled up lab capacity, strong capacity on surveillance and rapid responses, and mandatory quarantine  	Initial limitation in lab capacity, contact tracing not rigorously implemented, self quarantine at home may not effective in prevention of spreading
 Availability of PPE	Self reliance through local production 	Initial shortage but rectified by scaling up local production 	Critical shortage, reliance on suppliers from the developing world.  
 Treatment and access to care 	Access is facilitated by Universal Health Coverage, plus additional budget allocation; no supply side constraints when cases are brought under control 	Universal Coverage grants full access, plus additional budget allocation, treatment is free for all Thais and non-Thais	Federal government pays doctors and hospitals for the uninsured at Medicare rates, but balance billing not allowed; there are a long queues and limited access given supply side constraints 
2. Mobilizing surge capacity and critical  resources for COVID 	Significant resource mobilization from central government to support Wuhan responses 	Cases are few and within resource capacity of each province 	Inadequate federal government support to state’s mitigation efforts
3. Governance and public communication	Effective whole-of-government approach; daily update and high trust in the population  	Whole-of-government responses led by Prime Minister, effective daily communication builds trust and gains citizen adherence to measures 	Conflicting announcements between governor and mayor; generally inconsistent, incongruent, insufficient, confused and contradictory public messaging in the US  
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